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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant Dilawar M. Edwards, a tenured professor at the 
California University of Pennsylvania, brought this action 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, alleging that the University 
and its officers ("the University") violated several of his 
constitutional rights. Specifically, Edwards claimed that the 
University deprived him of his rights to free speech, due 
process, and equal protection by restricting his choice of 
classroom materials, criticizing his teaching performance, 
and suspending him with pay for a portion of one academic 
term. In addition, Edwards alleged that the University 
retaliated against him for filing this lawsuit. 
 
Prior to trial, the district court dismissed Edwards's equal 
protection claim and granted summary judgment in favor of 
the University on Edwards's due process claim. The case 
then went to trial on Edwards's First Amendment and 
retaliation claims, and a jury returned a verdict for the 
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University. On appeal, Edwards assigns as error: 1) the 
district court's First Amendment jury instruction; 2) the 
district court's grant of summary judgment on his due 
process claim; 3) the district court's dismissal of his equal 
protection claim; 4) the district court's ruling that the 
verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence; 
and 5) the district court's decision not to permit a third 
amended complaint. We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
During the time-period at issue in this case, Professor 
Edwards taught a course at the University entitled 
"Introduction to Educational Media" (IEM). Syllabi from the 
early 1980s indicate that the IEM course initially focused 
on how teachers can effectively use various classroom tools, 
such as projection equipment, chalkboards, photographs, 
and films. See App. I at 299-306. Later syllabi prepared by 
Edwards, however, included a new emphasis on issues of 
bias, censorship, religion, and humanism, and Edwards 
listed numerous publications concerning these issues as 
required or suggested reading. Id. at 307-37. 
 
In May 1989, one of Edwards's students complained to 
University officials that Edwards had used the IEM class to 
advance religious ideas. On August 14, 1989, the 
University's Vice President for Academic Affairs, Nancy 
Nelson, wrote a letter to Edwards in which she outlined the 
student's concerns and indicated that a meeting on the 
issue would be held in the fall. Nelson met with Edwards 
and other school officials to discuss the complaint and, on 
November 28, 1989, Nelson wrote to Edwards and directed 
that he "cease and desist" from using "doctrinaire 
material[s]" of a religious nature. App. I at 366. Edwards 
appealed this decision to the President of the University, 
John Pierce Watkins, and the two exchanged letters 
through July 1990. Watkins expressed his approval of 
Nelson's actions and directed Edwards to avoid advancing 
religious beliefs through his lectures and handouts. Dr. 
Edwards continued to teach the IEM course during the 
1991 and 1992 school years. 
 
In 1992, Professor David Campbell was named chair of 
the Education Department at the University. Upon 
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assuming this position, Campbell became concerned that 
Edwards had "interjected something that didn't belong in 
the [IEM] course[:] A distinct bias on religion and religious 
questions." App. II, Trial Tr. 2/13/97, at 38. After 
concluding that Edwards was teaching from a non- 
approved syllabus, Campbell brought the issue to the 
department faculty during the Spring 1993 term, and the 
faculty voted to reinstate an earlier version of the IEM 
syllabus. Relying on the earlier syllabus, Campbell revoked 
certain book orders that Edwards had made for the Fall 
1993 semester and, when Edwards objected, Campbell told 
him that he could put the matter on the agenda for the 
September 1993 faculty meeting. Campbell testified that 
Edwards never asked that the matter be placed on the 
meeting's agenda. 
 
In the weeks prior to the Fall 1993 term, Professor 
Edwards's schedule was rearranged, and he was assigned 
to teach an additional course -- "Educational Tests and 
Measurements" (ETM) -- that he had never taught. 
Edwards was dissatisfied with the change, and Campbell 
received complaints that Edwards failed to attend some of 
his ETM classes and walked out of others. At the 
September 1993 faculty meeting, Campbell and Edwards 
engaged in an exchange in which Campbell called Edwards 
an "embarrassment to the department" and made 
comments to the effect that Edwards might be better suited 
to a "fundamentalist college[ ]" than a "public university." 
App. I at 391, 400. A non-verbatim account of the meeting 
was distributed to all members of the Education 
Department. 
 
In response to the student complaints about Edwards's 
ETM class, school administrators put together a packet of 
materials that they wished to discuss with Edwards. The 
administration scheduled a meeting for Monday, October 
25, 1993, but apparently did not mail the packet to 
Edwards until Friday, October 22, 1993. Upon arriving at 
the meeting, Edwards stated that he had not received any 
materials in the mail and he asked for additional time to 
prepare. App. I at 408-10. At this point, Nancy Nelson 
relieved Edwards of his duties, with pay, until he was ready 
to discuss the University's concerns. Id. at 411. Edwards 
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remained suspended with pay for the remainder of the 
semester but returned to the classroom for the Spring 1994 
term to teach two ETM courses and one IEM course. 
 
Edwards initially brought suit against the University in 
September 1991, alleging violations of his First Amendment 
free speech rights, his Fourteenth Amendment due process 
rights, and his rights under the Establishment Clause. In 
October 1991, Edwards filed an amended complaint which 
included an equal protection claim. After his suspension in 
1993, Edwards filed a second amended complaint which 
contained a free speech claim, a retaliation claim, a due 
process claim, and an equal protection claim. The district 
court granted summary judgment on Edwards's due 
process claim in January 1997, and the court denied 
Edwards's motion for reconsideration in February 1997. On 
February 11, 1997, the first day of trial, the district sua 
sponte dismissed Edwards's equal protection claim for 
failure to state a claim and denied Edwards's motion to file 
a third amended complaint. The case then went to trial on 
Edwards's First Amendment and retaliation claims. 
 
Before submitting the case to the jury, the district court 
held a conference on jury instructions and rejected much of 
Edwards's proposed First Amendment instruction. After the 
jury returned a verdict for the University, Edwards moved 
for a new trial. The district court denied Edwards's motion, 
and Edwards appealed. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
Edwards first contends that the district court 
inadequately instructed the jury on the issue of whether 
the University violated his First Amendment rights by 
restricting his "choice of curriculum materials and the 
content and subjects of his classes." Appellant's Br. at 27. 
Although Edwards agrees with the standard given by the 
district court -- that the University had to show that its 
actions were "reasonably related to a legitimate educational 
interest," App. IV, Trial Tr. Feb. 25, 1997, at 26 -- Edwards 
argues that the district court did not adequately explain 
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this standard and, thus, "permitted the jury to speculate on 
the parameters of freedom of speech." Appellant's Br. at 24. 
Specifically, Edwards contends that the district court failed 
to provide guidance in the following four areas: 1) the 
necessity of avoiding viewpoint discrimination; 2) the 
strength of a professor's academic freedom rights; 3) the 
correct legal standard regarding the discussion of religious 
issues in public classrooms; and 4) the existence of a 
professor's right to choose his curriculum materials absent 
an official school policy. 
 
We do not find it necessary to determine whether the 
district court's instruction adequately defined the 
"reasonably related to a legitimate educational interest" 
standard because, as a threshold matter, we conclude that 
a public university professor does not have a First 
Amendment right to decide what will be taught in the 
classroom. This conclusion is compelled by our decision in 
Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 
1990), where we explained that "no court has found that 
teachers' First Amendment rights extend to choosing their 
own curriculum or classroom management techniques in 
contravention of school policy or dictates." Id. at 1176. 
Consistent with this observation, we concluded that 
"[a]lthough a teacher's out-of-class conduct, including her 
advocacy of particular teaching methods, is protected, her 
in-class conduct is not." Id. (citation omitted).1 Therefore, 
although Edwards has a right to advocate outside of the 
classroom for the use of certain curriculum materials, he 
does not have a right to use those materials in the 
classroom. Accord Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Edwards interprets Bradley as holding that "in the absence of an 
official existing school policy prohibiting" a professor from selecting 
certain classroom materials, a professor has a First Amendment right to 
choose his curriculum materials. See Appellant's Br. at 28. This 
interpretation ignores: 1) the Bradley court's instruction that public 
school teachers must abide by "school policy or dictates" when choosing 
their curriculum, 910 F.2d at 1176 (emphasis added); 2) the court's 
broad conclusion that a public school teacher's"in class conduct is not" 
protected by the First Amendment, id.; and 3) the fact that the school in 
Bradley, like the University here, took action without establishing an 
official policy. Id. at 1174. 
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136 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 1998) (in banc) ("We agree . . . 
that the school, not the teacher, has the right tofix the 
curriculum."); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 
F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Although the concept of 
academic freedom has been recognized in our 
jurisprudence, the doctrine has never conferred upon 
teachers the control of public school curricula."). But see 
Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(finding that a public university's restrictions on a 
professor's in-class speech "implicate[d] First Amendment 
freedoms"). 
 
Our conclusion that the First Amendment does not place 
restrictions on a public university's ability to control its 
curriculum is consistent with the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence concerning the state's ability to say what it 
wishes when it is the speaker. The following passage from 
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), 
addresses this issue in the university context: 
 
       [W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make content- 
       based choices. When the University determines the 
       content of the education it provides, it is the University 
       speaking, and we have permitted the government to 
       regulate the content of what is or is not expressed 
       when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities 
       to convey its own message. . . . It does not follow, 
       however, . . . that viewpoint-based restrictions are 
       proper when the University does not speak itself or 
       subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead 
       expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from 
       private speakers. A holding that the University may not 
       discriminate based on viewpoint of private persons 
       whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the 
       University's own speech, which is controlled by 
       different principles. 
 
Id. at 833-34. Since the University's actions in the instant 
case concerned the "content of the education it provides," 
id. at 833, we find that the University was acting as 
speaker and was entitled to make content-based choices in 
restricting Edwards's syllabus. 
 
Edwards's reliance on the principle of academic freedom 
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does not affect our conclusion that the University can make 
content-based decisions when shaping its curriculum. The 
Supreme Court has explained that "[a]cademic freedom 
thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited 
exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, 
and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous 
decisionmaking by the academy itself." Regents of Univ. of 
Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (citations 
omitted). The "four essential freedoms" that constitute 
academic freedom have been described as a university's 
freedom to choose "who may teach, what may be taught, 
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." 
Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (quotations omitted). 2 In sum, 
caselaw from the Supreme Court and this court on 
academic freedom and the First Amendment compel the 
conclusion that Edwards does not have a constitutional 
right to choose curriculum materials in contravention of the 
University's dictates. Accordingly, we affirm the district 
court's decision not to grant a new trial on this issue. 
 
B. 
 
Edwards's second contention is that the district court 
erred when it granted summary judgment for the University 
on his procedural due process claim. The district court 
initially ruled on this issue prior to trial, concluding that, 
"because Edwards was suspended with pay, he cannot 
prove that he was deprived of a property interest deserving 
due process guarantees." App. I at 138. Edwards moved for 
reconsideration on the ground that the district court's 
opinion did not adequately consider whether he had been 
deprived of a liberty interest. The district court denied 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Edwards's contention that the Supreme Court has elsewhere defined 
academic freedom as the "principle that individual instructors are at 
liberty to teach that which they deem to be appropriate," Appellant's Br. 
at 31, is incorrect. The case cited for this proposition, Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), reaches no such conclusion. Rather, the 
passage relied upon by Edwards simply describes the conclusion of the 
court of appeals in that case. Id. 586 n.6. At no point in Aguillard, 
which 
is an Establishment Clause case, does the Court define academic 
freedom for purposes of the Free Speech Clause. 
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Edwards's motion, explaining that he had not "pleaded 
facts sufficient to make out a liberty interest claim 
regarding reputation." App. II, Feb. 12, 1997 Trial Tr. at 12. 
We agree. 
 
This court has previously held that "[s]tigma to 
reputation alone, absent some accompanying deprivation of 
present or future employment, is not a liberty interest 
protected by the fourteenth amendment." Robb v. City of 
Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 294 (3d Cir. 1984). See also 
Strum v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1012 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(explaining that the Supreme Court has required"both 
damage to reputation and the extinguishment of 
government employment as a predicate for due process 
protection."). Since it is undisputed that Edwards remained 
employed with pay at all times relevant to this case, his 
claim is barred by our decisions in Robb and Strum. While 
Edwards's temporary removal from class duties may have 
further stigmatized him, this action does not constitute a 
deprivation of employment. Therefore, we will affirm the 
district court's grant of summary judgment on Edwards's 
due process claim. 
 
C. 
 
Edwards next contends that the district court improperly 
dismissed his equal protection claim. In making this 
argument, Edwards places considerable reliance on facts 
that came out at trial. See Appellant's Br. at 42; Appellant's 
Reply Br. at 18. However, the district court dismissed 
Edwards's equal protection claim prior to trial because 
Edwards's counsel admitted that the second amended 
complaint did not adequately allege an equal protection 
violation. See App. II, Feb. 11, 1997 Trial Tr. at 9-10, 74-75.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The relevant exchange between the district court and Edwards's trial 
counsel, Jack Parson, proceeded as follows: 
 
       The Court:  What do you think you need to do to make out an 
       equal protection claim, don't you have to show 
       persons similarly situated were treated in a different 
       manner because of participation in a protected class? 
 
       Mr. Carson: That's the criteria. 
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Under these circumstances, Edwards is not entitled to 
revive his equal protection claim on appeal. 
 
D. 
 
Edwards's final two contentions -- that the verdict was 
against the great weight of the evidence and that he should 
have been allowed to file a third amended complaint on the 
first day of trial -- are both without merit. Accordingly, we 
affirm the district court's resolution of both issues. 
 
III. 
 
In sum, we conclude: 1) that Professor Edwards does not 
have a First Amendment right to choose classroom 
materials and subjects in contravention of the University's 
dictates; 2) that Edwards failed to state a procedural due 
process liberty claim because he did not allege a 
deprivation of employment; and 3) that the district court 
properly dismissed Edwards's equal protection claim after 
Edwards's own counsel conceded that the complaint failed 
to adequately state such a claim. We find Edwards's 
remaining arguments on appeal to be without merit. 
Accordingly, we affirm. We emphasize that we only pass on 
the narrow legal issues presented to us. Nothing in our 
opinion should be read to mean that we condone all of the 
conduct of the University officials that was revealed at trial. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       The Court:  Where's that allegation? 
 
       Mr. Carson: In this amended complaint, it is not there, not 
       specifically set out. 
 
       The Court:  This is the complaint. Okay. You are saying no equal 
       protection argument in the second amended 
       complaint? 
 
       Mr. Carson: No, Your Honor. 
 
       The Court:  There is none? 
 
       Mr. Carson: No. 
 
App. II, Feb. 11, 1997 Trial Tr. at 9-10. 
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